

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BUENOS 03602 01 OF 03 232257Z

72

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-02 EB-07

CU-02 MMS-01 ACDA-05 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00

AGR-05 PC-01 AID-05 COME-00 OPIC-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00

PER-01 DRC-01 /077 W

----- 044850

R 232110Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1309

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3602

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XM, AR

SUBJ: REVISIONS TO THE CASP

REF: A. A-85 OF APRIL 11, 1975; B. BA 3425

1. FOLLOWING ARE REVISIONS TO THE FY 1976-77 CASP, WHICH WAS FORWARDED UNDER COVER OF REF A. THESE REVISIONS SHOULD BE RAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EMBASSY'S MOST RECENT REASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE (SEE REF B).

2. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW, FOURTH PARAGRAPH: EVERYTHING AFTER THE SENTENCE "THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME UNBREAKABLE BOND BETWEEN THE TWO", SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ: "IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT LOPEZ REGA COULD BE FORCED OUT BY THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SECTORS, BUT THE LATTER HAVE SO FAR PROVED INCAPABLE OF STANDING TOGETHER AGAINST HIM. AT THIS POINT, THEY ARE DEMORALIZED AND CONFUSED. THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REGROUP. THE ARMED FORCES, THEN, ARE THE ONLY SECTOR STILL TO STAND IN LOPEZ REGA'S WAY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO TAKE POWER, BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE, THEY WILL PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO DO SO. LOPEZ REGA, MEANWHILE, WILL ATTEMPT TO CUT THE GOUND FROM UNDER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 03602 01 OF 03 232257Z

THE MILITARY OPPOSITION AND HEAD OFF A GOLPE. LOGICALLY,

THE ODDS ARE WITH THE ARMED FORCES, BUT LOPEZ REGA HAS SHOWN AN IMPRESSIVE ABILITY FOR MANEUVER AND CANNOT BE COUNTED OUT. HE IS ALREADY THE OBVIOUS POWER BEHIND THE THRONE, THE MAN WHO IS RUNNING THE SHOW, AND HE JUST MIGHT YET MAKE HIMSELF THE STRONGMAN OF ARGENTINA IN HIS OWN RIGHT--DESPITE ALL THE ODDS AGAINST HIM.

3. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW, PARAGRAPH FIVE: "COLLAPSING GOVERNMENT" SHOULD BE CHANGE TO READ "WEAK AND IN-EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT".

4. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW, LAST LINE OF PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH: SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ "...BEST POSSIBLE OWRKING RELATIONSHIP WITH APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOA."

5. AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW, LAST LINE OF LAST PARAGRAPH: SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: " THE EMBASSY SETS FOR ITSELF THE TASK OF MAINTAINING A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP DURING THE PERIOD OF EXTREME FLUX WHICH MAY SOON BE UPON ARGENTINA".

6. UPON REFLECTION, EMBASSY HAS DECIDED TO DROP ISSUE NO. ONE. TERRORISM AND CONSEQUENT THREAT TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND TO US BUSINESSES IN ARGENTINA IS AND WILL REMAIN ONE OF FOREMOST PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE. HOWEVER, NO MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS ARE INVOLVED AT THIS POINT. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE WILL CONTINUE "TO IMPRESS UPON GOA THAT AS HOST GOVERNMENT IT HAS THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY OF PROTECTION OF US CITIZENS RESIDENT HERE", AND THAT WE WILL ALSO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION TO PROTECT OUR EMPLOYEES. HENCE, THOUGH PROBLEM OF TERRORISM IS A PRESSING ONE, IT NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A MAJRO ISSUE FOR THE CASP.

7. ISSUE NO. THREE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY REVISED. IT NOW READS AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT OF ISSUE NO. THREE

WITH SOME MODIFICATION OF POLICY (ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC)  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BUENOS 03602 01 OF 03 232257Z

AND CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL (ESPECIALLY THE REMOVAL OF LOPEZ REGA) MRS. PERON COULD FINISH HER TERM. HOWEVER, THE CHANCES ARE BETTER THAN EVEN THAT THOSE CHANGES WILL NOT BE MADE AND THAT SHE WILL BE REPLACED AS PRESIDENT BEFORE OR DURING FY 76. MEANWHILE, LOPEZ REGA HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS THE VIRTUALLY UNCHALLENGED POWER BEHIND THE THRONE AND IS REACHING FOR MORE. THE QUESTIONS FOR US POLICY MAKERS, THEN, ARE: A)

WHAT SHOULD BE THE US POSTURE VIS-A-VIS A GOVERNMENT NOW CLEARLY CONTROLLED BY LOPEZ REGA; B) WHAT SHOULD BE THE US ATTITUDE SHOULD LOPEZ REGA ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS THE CHIEF OF STATE; AND C) HOW SHOULD THE US REACT IF THE MILITARY AGAIN TAKE POWER?

IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS

1. THE PRESSURES ON MRS. PERON WILL INCREASE AS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS MOUNT. THE TERRORIST PROBLEM IS DEALT WITH ELSEWHERE. SUFFICE IT TO SAY HERE THAT IT IS LIKELY TO GET WORSE. THE ASIDE, EVEN MORE DAMAGING ARE THE GROWING SIGNS OF DISILLUSIONMENT AND FRACTURING WITHIN THE PERONIST MOVEMENT ITSELF. THE ECONOMY IS CONTINUING TO SHOW SIGNS OF SERIOUS DISARRAY DUE TO MISMANAGEMENT AND WIDESPREAD INEFFICIENCY. INFLATION AND SHORTAGES WILL RESULT IN INCREASING POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND WILL ACCELERATE THE EVAPORATION OF MRS. PERON'S POPULAR SUPPORT.

2. JOSE LOPEZ REGA REMAINS THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE IN HER GOVERNMENT. NOTHING HAS POISONED THE ATMOSPHERE FOR MRS. PERON'S GOVERNMENT MORE THAN HER CONTINUED RETENTION OF LOPEZ REGA.

3. LOPEZ REGA HAS, NONETHELESS, CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION AS THE CURT FAVORITE WHO IS REALLY RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS OUTMANEUVERED OR FACED DOWN HIS CIVILIAN POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND HAS SUCCEEDED IN PLACING HIS OWN MEN AT THE HEAD OF THE FEDERAL POLICE AND OF THE ARMY. THIS DOES NOT HOWEVER INSURE HIS CONTROL OF EITHER. HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS DOUBTLESS TO MAKE HIMSELF ARGENTINA'S CHIEF EXECUTIVE. THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE THAT HE COULD DO SO THROUGH HONEST ELECTIONS, BUT HE COULD RIG THEM, OR INSTALL HIMSELF THROUGH SOME POWER MANEUVER. BEFORE HE ATTEMPTS HIS FINAL ASSAULT ON POWER,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BUENOS 03602 01 OF 03 232257Z

THOUGH, HE MUST FIRST NEUTRALIZE THE ARMY--AND THAT MAY PROVE BEYOND HIS GRASP.

4. THE ARMED FORCES DO NOT WISH TO SEIZE POWER THROUGH A GOLPE, BUT MAY BEFORE THE END OF 1975 DECIDE THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY FEEL THREATENED AS AN INSTITUTION BY LOPEZ REGA'S MACHINATIONS. UNDER ANAYA, THE ARMY LACKED A STRONG LEADER. LAPLANE IS STILL A QUESTION MARK BUT APPEARS TO HAVE POLITICAL ASTUTENESS AND LEADERSHIP QUALITIES. ALTHOUGH APPOINTED BY LOPEZ REGA, HE IS FIRST AND FOREMOST AN ARMY GENERAL, AND, AS SUGGESTED BY THE WAY HE STUCK TO HIS GUNS ON QUESTION OF SENIOR ARMY APPOINTMENTS (SEE BA3531), COULD WELL BE TEMPTED TO MAKE BOLD MOVE ON HIS OWN. HE WILL BEAR WATCHING.

5. MOST SECTORS ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTS  
POLICIES, BUT WILL REMAIN INTERESTED IN PRESERVING CON-  
STITUTIONALISM AND CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALI-  
ZATION.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BUENOS 03602 02 OF 03 232158Z

72

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-02 EB-07

CU-02 MMS-01 ACDA-05 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00

AGR-05 PC-01 AID-05 COME-00 OPIC-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00

PER-01 DRC-01 /077 W

----- 043749

R 232110Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1310

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3602

ISSUE RESOLUTION. THE SITUATION IS TOO CONFUSED  
AND THERE ARE TOO MANY IMPONDERABLES TO PERMIT  
PRECISE PREDICTIONS AS TO ITS OUTCOME, LET ALONE  
DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO HOW TO RESPOND.  
SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE BORNE IN  
MIND

, HOWEVER, NO MATTER WHAT THE OUTCOME: A)  
MAJOR US ATTENTION SHOULD BE ON OUR LONG-RANGE  
INTERESTS AND ON FORGING A STRONG AND ENDURING  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARGENTINE NATION, AS  
OPPOSED TO THE EPHEMERAL RELATIONSHIP WE MAY  
DEVELOP WITH MRS. PERON, LOPEZ REGA OR SOMEONE  
ELSE. ACTIONS WHICH SERVE THE LATTER AT THE  
EXPENSE OF THE FORMER SHOULD BE ESCHEWED, OR  
AT LEAST APPROACHED WITH  
UTMOST CAUTION. IT  
MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, SERVE OUR SHORT-TERM  
INTERESTS TO INVITE LOPEZ REGA TO VISIT THE  
US. HE IS THE POWER AND SUCH AN INVITATION  
MIGHT HELP US TO DEVELOP A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP

WITH HIM. WHETHER IT WOULD HELP OUR LONG-RANGE INTERESTS, HOWEVER, IS MOST QUESTIONABLE. IT WOULD IMPLY THE KIND OF EFFUSIVE EMBRACE WHICH WOULD BE UNDIGNIFIED AND WHICH WOULD  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 03602 02 OF 03 232158Z

UNDERCUT OUR POSITION WITH FUTURE GOVERNMENTS. COOPERATION WITH FONMIN VIGNES IN EFFORTS TO CONSTRUCT A MORE PERFECT HEMISPHERIC SYSTEM, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF ACTION WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A RELATIONSHIP WHOSE IMPORTANCE TRANSCENDS THAT OF PASSING GOVERNMENTS. B) GIVEN THE CONFUSION THAT IS LIKELY TO EXIST IN ARGENTINA FOR SOME TIME TO COME, PROBABLY THE BEST US POSTURE IS ONE OF HOLDING ITSELF ALOOF FROM THE INTERNAL STRIFE AND PURSUING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE GOA IN A SCRUPULOUSLY CORRECT, DIGNIFIED MANNER. C) NONETHELESS, WE ARE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE ARGENTINE INSTITUTIONS STRENGTHENED AND WE SHOULD DO WHAT LITTLE WE PROPERLY CAN TO ENCOURAGE ACTIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THAT END. RECOMMENDATIONS GEARED TO THE THREE SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES INDICATED IN THE STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ARE AS FOLLOWS: (1) US POSTURE VIS-A-VIS A GOVERNMENT IN WHICH LOPEZ REGA IS THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE (I.E. THE PRESENT SITUATION): WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE NORMAL AND APPROPRIATE CHANNELS--WITH MRS. PERON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. WE MAY HAVE TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH LOPEZ REGA UPON OCCASION EVEN IN MATTERS WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH SOCIAL WELFARE, BUT WE SHOULD DO SO ONLY WHEN THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS NO POINT IN ANTAGONIZING HIM. ESSENTIALLY, THIS IS AN INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO INVOLVE OURSELVES. HENCE, WE SHOULD SHOW LOPEZ REGA THE SAME COURTESY AND CONSIDERATION WE WOULD SHOW ANY OTHER CABINET MINISTER. WHEN WE MUST DEAL WITH HIM, WE SHOULD DO SO IN THE SPIRIT OF PRAGMATISM. IN SHORT, WE MUST BE REALISTIC BUT WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT EMBRACE LOPEZ REGA. WITH RESPECT TO OUR ACTIONS, WE SHOULD NOT ALTER SIGNIFICANTLY OUR PRESENT COURSE. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BUENOS 03602 02 OF 03 232158Z

OUR TWO NATIONS AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF OUR LONG-RANGE BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE MUST, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO EXAMINE EACH OF OUR ACTIONS CAREFULLY WITH A VIEW TO WHOM OR WHAT THEY BENEFIT THE MOST. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE MOMENT IT MAKES SOME SENSE FOR THE USG TO LOOK FAVORABLY UPON THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THE 600 MILLION DOLLAR FINANCING PACKAGE WHICH THE GOA IS CURRENTLY SEEKING FROM PRIVATE BANKS IN THE US. THE ECONOMIC TEAM UNDER ECONOMY MINISTER GOMEZ MORALES HAS BEEN A SOUND ONE, AND HAS BEEN TRYING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (DESPITE THE INTERFERENCE OF LOPEZ REGA). THE LOANS COULD HAVE GIVEN IT MORE BREATHING ROOM, AND CONTRIBUTED GENERALLY TO STRENGTHENING THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY (AT A PROFIT TO OURSELVES). FOR FUTURE REFERENCE, HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT LOPEZ REGA WILL SOON GET RID OF GOMEZ MORALES AND APPOINT ONE OF HIS OWN MEN, PROBABLY CELESTINO RODRIGO. SHOULD IT BECOME CLEAR THAT HE IS THROWING OVER ANY SORT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND BASING ECONOMIC DECISIONS ON INTERNAL POLITICAL MOVES AND PERSONAL GAIN, THE USG WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A MORE NEGATIVE POSITION. A LOAN, UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS, MIGHT BENEFIT NOTHING OTHER THAN LOPEZ REGA'S POCKET.

(2) WHAT SHOULD BE THE US POSTURE IF LOPEZ REGA MAKES HIMSELF CHIEF OF STATE? THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL REALISTICALLY WITH LOPEZ REGA AND TO MAINTAIN CORRECT RELATIONS WITH THE GOA. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO AVOID EMBRACING HIM--BOTH BECAUSE A GOVERNMENT HE HEADED WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO PROVE DURABLE, AND ALSO BECAUSE HE IS THE SORT OF UNSTABLE, AT TIMES IRRATIONAL, LEADER WITH WHOM IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A SOUND RELATIONSHIP. IN SHORT, WE SHOULD PROTECT OUR INTERESTS AND BE CORRECT, BUT WE SHOULD KEEP OUR DISTANCE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BUENOS 03602 02 OF 03 232158Z

(3) WHAT POSITION SHOULD THE US TAKE IN THE PROBABLE EVENT THAT THE ARMED FORCES OVERTHROW THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT? WE FAVOR CONSTITUTIONAL

GOVERNMENT. SO DO MOST ARGENTINES. SO LONG AS  
MRS. PERON'S GOVERNMENT WAS (OR IS) THE BEST  
INSTRUMENT OF ASSURING IT, SHE DESERVED SUPPORT.  
GIVEN LOPEZ REGA'S FINAL OBJECTIVES, HOWEVER,  
HER GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE BECOME AN INSTRUMENT  
LEADING TO THE ABYSS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM.  
CONSTITUTIONALISM MIGHT BE DAMAGED LESS  
PERMANENTLY BY A GOLPE THAN BY LOPEZ REGA.  
HENCE, WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE GOLPE, IF IT COMES,  
REALISTICALLY. WE NEED NOT RUSH TO CONGRATULATE  
THE MILITARY, BUT WE SHOULD EXTEND RECOGNITION  
AND CARRY ON NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THEM. HOW  
WARM OUR RELATIONS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BECOME WOULD  
DEPEND UPON THE MILITARY THEMSELVES. IF THEY  
APPEAR TO BE RETURNING ARGENTINA TO THE PATH OF  
RATIONALITY AND CONSENSUS, A MORE CORDIAL, UNDER-  
STANDING POSTURE ON OUR PART WOULD BE IN ORDER.  
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ATTEMPT A HEAVY-  
HANDED DICTATORSHIP, OUR RELATIONS SHOULD REMAIN

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BUENOS 03602 03 OF 03 232220Z

72

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-02 EB-07

CU-02 MMS-01 ACDA-05 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00

AGR-05 PC-01 AID-05 COME-00 OPIC-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00

PER-01 DRC-01 /077 W

----- 044190

R 232110Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1311

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3602

CORRECT BUT COOL.

REASONS: REASONS ARE STATED ALONG WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS.

ALTERNATIVES: (1) LOPEZ REGA BEHIND THE THRONE. A) WE COULD

MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DISAPPROVE OF HIM AND WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH HIM. THIS, HOWEVER, MIGHT SIMPLY GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO POSE AS "DEFENDER OF NATINALISM AGAINST THE YANKEE IMPERIALISTS." WE WOULD THEN HAVE STRENGTHENED HIM WHILE TAKING A POSITION PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF OUR TANGIBLE INTERESTS. B) WE COULD EVEN NOW SIGNAL OUR SYMPATHY FOR HIM, DEVELOPE A CLOSE, CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP WIT HIM AND THROUGH HIM TRY TO SOLVE TO OUR ADVANTAGE OUR VARIOUS INVESTMENT PROBLEMS. AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, THIS MIGHT SERVE OUR SHORT-TERM INTERESTS, BUT PROVE PREJUDICIAL TO US IN THE LONG RUN.

(2) LOPEZ REGA AS CHIEF OF STATE. A) HE WOULD PROBABLY TAKE POWER THROUGH EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS. THE UD COULD SIGNAL SHARP DISAPPROVAL AND FREEZE RELATIONS, PERHAPS EVEN SEVERING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THIS WOULD BE AN EXAGGERATED RESPONSE, HOWEVER, AND PROBABLY WOULD AVAIL US VERY LITTLE. B) WE COULD CLIMB IN BED WITH LOPEZ REGA, WITH SAME NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ALREADY OUTLINED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BUENOS 03602 03 OF 03 232220Z

(3) THE MILITARY TAKEOVER. A) WE COULD REGISTER A SHARPLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE, POSSIBLE EVEN SEVERING RELATIONS. AS IN (2)(A), HOWEVER THE LOSSES WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH THE GAINS. B) WE COULD RUSH TO EMBARACE THE MILITARY. TO DO SO BEFORE WE SAW IN WHICH DIRECTION THEY WERE HEADING, WOULD BE FOLLY.

8. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH UNDER US NATIONAL DEFENSE IS CHANGED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES, TERRIROTY AND FACILITIES

THE ARMED FORCES' POSTURE IS ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TOWARDS INTERNAL ORDER; HENCE, THE ARGENTINE FORCES ARE OF LITTLE POTENTIAL USE IN SUPPORT OF TOTAL US FORCE POLICY CONCEPT EXCEPT FOR SOME NAVAL ASW, COASTAL DEFENSE AND AIR FORCE OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLE TOKEN FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO UN OR OAS PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS, MOREOVER, ARGENTINA WOULD BE UNLIKELY T COMMIT FORCES IN ANY ACTION UNLESS ARGENTINE SECURITY WERE DIRECTLY THREATENED. FROM THE STRATEGIC STANDPOINT, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LANES AND THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE THE PASSAGE AROUND THE HORN WOULD TAKE ON SHOULD THE PANAMA CANAL BE CLOSED, ARGENTINA IS IMPORTANT.

9. THE NEXT PARAGRAPH UNDER US NATIONAL DEFENSE,

THAT CONCERNING DEFENSE AGAINST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT, SHOULD ALSO BE CHANGED. WORDS "ITS GREATER EFFORT" AT BE-



GINNING OF SENTENCE IN LINE SIX SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "THE ARGENTINE ARMY".

10. IN TABLE 2, TOTAL DOD FIGURES FOR FY 76 AND 77 SHOULD BE 59 RATHER THAN 56.

11. ISSUE NO. 2 ON ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IF BEING REVIEWED AND SOME REVISIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING.  
HILL

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GOVERNMENT REFORM, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL SITUATION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** buchant0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BUENOS03602  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750182-0781  
**From:** BUENOS AIRES  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750520/aaaaarpu.tel  
**Line Count:** 448  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ARA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 A-85, 75 OF APRIL 11, 75 1975, 75 BA 3425  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** buchant0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 SEP 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 SEP 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <17 DEC 2003 by buchant0>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** REVISIONS TO THE CASP  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINT, XM, AR, (LOPEZ REGA, JOSE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006